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ABSTRACT
Using an overlapping generations (OLG) model, we show how 
relatively small open economies can enhance their growth through 
educational subsidies financed via public debt and reduce their 
fertility rate. We show that subsidising education through public debt 
leads to an A-Pareto improvement of all generations. Even if a country 
is a net borrower in the international capital market, we show that this 
subsidy policy can help, under certain conditions, to improve its net 
borrowing position. This has strong implications for the calculation 
of the 3% deficit to Gross Domestic Product ratio set by the European 
Union because the analysis implies that public expenditures for 
education should be subtracted from the government deficit before 
applying the deficit criterion.
1. Introduction
In the presence of the austerity policy applied in the European Union (EU) and the restric-
tions set by the stability and growth pact (SGP) for European Union member states, it 
should be considered if the public expenditures for education should be exempted from 
calculation of 3% government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) limit. In 2011, 
the share of public expenditures for education as a percentage of GDP in the EU differed 
between 3.1% (Romania) and 8.8% (Denmark).1 On the other hand, in the same period, the 
private expenditures for education in the EU were relatively low – between 0.1% (Romania) 
and 1.75% (Cyprus).2 Since public expenditure for education is accounted for as govern-
ment consumption in the national accounts and not investment expenditure, the education 
expenditure is exposed to austerity measures.3
It is well-known in the economic literature that human capital accumulation creates 
positive externalities for future generations (cf. Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000). This exter-
nality is due to the fact that parents who invest in the human capital of their children do 
not internalise the increase of the overall efficiency of the human capital accumulation 
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process. Therefore, many economists (cf. Becker & Murphy, 1988; Boldrin & Montes, 2005; 
Kaganovich & Meier, 2012; Peters, 1995; Rangel, 2003) interpret a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
pension system as a mechanism through which the intergenerational externality can be 
internalised. The basic idea in these models is that in a PAYG pension system, the pensions 
depend on the labour income of the working generation. The labour income depends on 
the human capital stock of the young generation and therefore on the investments of their 
parents in education. Consequently, the parents benefit from it through higher pensions.
However, the majority of papers which focus on the question of how to internalise the 
externality created by human capital building assume a constant population or a constant 
fertility rate. In contrast to these models, we endogenise the fertility behaviour and instead 
of analysing a PAYG pension system, we propose an education subsidy which is financed 
by a public debt to internalise the intertemporal externality.
Even though a public debt is similar to a PAYG pension system, there are some differ-
ences which make an investigation worthwhile. The difference between a pension system 
and a public debt is that the former immediately redistributes income from the working 
population to the older non-working generation and therefore reduces the private savings. 
If the government sells bonds on the international capital market or borrow alternatively 
from an institution like the World Bank or donor country in the case of a less-developed 
country (LDC), the country will experience an inflow of income from abroad. Additionally, 
in the case of LDCs, the introduction of a PAYG pension system seems to be unrealistic 
because of the existing public budget constraints in these countries. Moreover, even though 
the argument that parents benefit from educational investments in the presence of a PAYG 
pension system is justifiable from an economic point of view, it is not clear if this coher-
ence is recognised by parents in reality. In contrast, as noted by Boldrin and Montes (2004, 
p. 22), a subsidy seems to be a more compelling option.
The literature on endogenous fertility and human capital in growth model goes back to 
Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) and Becker and Barro (1988). Using an intertemporal 
utility function, they assume that that a higher fertility rate of the present generation raises 
the discount factor on future per capita consumption. Consequently, a higher fertility rate 
discourages investments in human and physical capital. On the other hand, higher stocks 
of physical and human capital (education) reduce the number of children because of the 
high cost of raising and caring for children.
One strand of the literature is based on the work of Kolmar (1997) who integrated 
only endogenous fertility behaviour in a standard OLG framework. His idea was further 
extended by Fenge and Meier (2005, 2009) and van Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam (2003). 
However, these scholars did not concentrate on public debts but on PAYG pension systems. 
They show that for a small country, under certain conditions, it is possible to increase the 
fertility rate and the welfare simultaneously. They assumed that the pensions depend on 
the number of children and that the growth in population attracts higher capital inflows 
so that all individuals are better off, are results which hold only for small open economies. 
On the contrary, Stauvermann, Ky, and Nam (2013) argue that, except for increase in fer-
tility rates, these results do not hold in an OLG-model with endogenous growth because 
reduced savings tend to reduce the per-capita growth rates and hence the welfare of future 
generations. Further, they show that an increase in fertility rate is accompanied by high 
costs for future generations, which further decrease the rates of capital accumulation, per 
capita growth, per capita capital and the labour income.
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Another strand of literature goes back to Bental (1989), Raut (1992), Cigno (1993), 
Stauvermann (1996), Zhang and Nishimura (1993), Zhang and Zhang (1995) and Zhang 
(1995). These authors interpret children as insurance for the old age. In their models, the 
introduction of a PAYG pension scheme decreases the importance of children and therefore 
the number of them declines. As a consequence, the per capita income growth rises and 
the fertility-reducing effect of a PAYG pension system offset the savings-reducing effect.
Moreover, Zhang (1997, 2003, 2006) and Li and Zhang (2008) provide another dimension 
on fertility and human capital accumulation. Their main assumptions are that individuals 
are perfectly altruistic in the sense of Barro (1974) with respect to their offspring and that 
the human capital accumulation is associated with external economies of scale. The latter 
idea introduced by Lucas (1988) shows that the private rate of return of human capital 
building is lower than the social rate of return. Subsequently, a government subsidy as an 
incentive to invest in human capital is able to equalise the private and social rate of return.
We acknowledge the role of external economies of scale. However we develop our model 
and present arguments even without explicitly factoring the role of external economies of 
scale. Notably, all models which include human capital accumulation but not perfect altru-
ism in the sense of Barro (1974) exhibit intergenerational externalities because parents who 
invest in the human capital of their offspring do not take into account the positive effects 
of investments for their grandchildren and great-grandchildren.
Another approach was developed by Wigger (2001), who argues that an education sub-
sidy financed by a lump-sum tax can be welfare-enhancing in a closed economy with a 
constant population, provided the cross derivative of the production function between 
human capital and physical capital is positive and sufficiently large. Additional empirical 
studies on the importance of education for economic growth can be found in De Fuentes 
(2003), Hanushek and Woessmann (2010) and the references therein.
As many others in the literature (cf. Peters, 1995; de la Croix & Doepke, 2003; Boldrin 
& Montes, 2005), we assume that parents derive a benefit from investing in the number of 
children and from investments in their children’s education. In such a framework we show 
that it is possible to internalise the intergenerational externality in a small open economy 
with the help of a public debt without harming any generation. We argue that the gener-
ation that gains from a human capital investment (children) should pay for it instead of 
putting the entire burden of responsibility on the current generation (parents). Under these 
conditions we show that it is possible to increase the growth of the economy by decreasing 
the number of children and increasing the growth rate of human capital accumulation. We 
argue that by subsidising education of children and not the number of them (a quality and 
quantity trade-off) will have a growth- and welfare-enhancing effect and a negative effect on 
fertility if the preference for the quantity of children exceeds the preference for the quality 
for children. Our main intention is to give a normative theoretical reasoning that public 
education and other educational subsidies should be financed by a government debt in the 
presence of a quality and quantity trade-off.
The rest of the article is outlined as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic model, 
which to a large extent is similar to Stauvermann and Kumar (2016). In Section 3, we derive 
the short-run effects caused by the introduction of an education subsidy followed by an 
analysis of the long-run effects. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude.
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2. The model
To model the production side of a small open economy, we use the approach of Lucas 
(1988) and Uzawa (1965). The production depends on physical and human capital and the 
production function has the following form: 
 
Here Yt is the production, Kt is the capital stock, and Ht = htLt, is the human capital stock 
which results from the product of the average human capital per head (ht) times the aggre-
gate labour time (Lt). The production function exhibits the usual diminishing marginal 
productivities in each input factor, fulfils the Inada conditions, and is linear homogenous.4 
The subscript t indicates the period of time.
Regarding the creation of human capital, for our purposes a very simple formulation of 
the human capital building process is sufficient because we assume that all individuals are 
identical: 
Therefore, the average human capital stock equals the individual human capital stock. This 
means the average human capital in time t depends on the parental average human capital 
stock, the time variant parental investments in education ut like schooling, and the effec-
tiveness of education 𝜑 > 0. The investments can be measured in monetary units,5 or in 
time units like parental time of home-schooling. However, we measure the human capital 
investments without loss of generality in time units the parents spend for teaching their 
children. These investments can be expressed in monetary terms if we use the wage rate 
as the value of time at the margin. For simplicity, we define the total available time of an 
adult to be equal to 1. The efforts of the parents or investments in education are represented 
by ut, where 0 ≤ ut < 1. It is easy to see that the human capital production function is a 
specification of the more general function of Azariadis and Drazen (1990) or de la Croix 
and Doepke (2003). In any case, the resulting growth rate of human capital ght  becomes:
 
We accept that there is a positive externality caused by human capital building because 
subsequent generations benefit from educational investments of former generations.
The wage rate per human capital unit w̃t and the interest factor Rt are determined on the 
world capital market, since we consider a reasonably small country. The capital stock used 
in this economy adjusts according to the factor prices on the world market. Assuming that 
the physical capital is totally depreciated within one period, we get the following equations:
 
 
The function f (k̃t = F
(
K̃t
Ht
, 1
)
 represents the production function per human capital unit. 
Then the resulting wage rate per capita is given by w = w̃tht. For the rest of the article 
(1)Yt = F(Kt ,Ht) = F
(
Kt , Ltht
)
.
(2)ht = ht−1(1 + 휑ut).
(3)ght = 휑ut .
(4)w̃t = f
(
k̃t
)
− f
�(
k̃t
)
k̃t
(5)Rt = f
�(
k̃t
)
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we assume that world economy is in the long-run equilibrium and therefore, w̃t = w̃, 
∀t andRt = R,∀t.
To model the consumption side of the economy, we use a three-period overlapping 
generation (OLG) model of Allais (1947), Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). This 
approach is extended by the introduction of human capital and endogenous fertility. Even 
though the fertility behaviour is based on similar considerations as in Becker (1960) and 
Becker and Lewis (1973)6 who introduced the quantity–quality trade-off of children, we 
use a different definition of a child’s quality. While Fanti and Gori (2008a, 2008b) use the 
definition of Becker (1960), where quality is defined as all expenditures for children, we 
define quality as time spent for the education of a child similar to Galor and Weil (1999) 
or de la Croix and Doepke (2003), and the results of the model is dependent on this defini-
tion. The model of Fanti and Gori (2008a, 2008b), which used Becker’s broader definition 
of child’s quality, has the disadvantage that parents never invest in the quality of children 
if they do not get a child allowance. That means that in a world without child allowances, 
parents never invest in human capital building. If the total costs of rearing and educating a 
child matter as an argument in the utility function, then the pure child rearing costs have 
a utility-enhancing effect and they are a perfect substitute to investments in education. In 
our model, these costs do not enter the utility function directly and an increase of them 
decreases the utility of the representative individual indirectly. Our decision to use human 
capital as an argument in the utility function coincides with the assumptions of the Unified 
Growth Theory (Galor, 2005).
In our model, in the first period of life, an individual is relatively young, not yet prepared 
to work, and/or participate in economic decision-making, and hence undergoes education 
funded by her parents. In the second period of life, the individual supplies labour which 
is considered to be inelastic, gives birth to Nt children, rears and educates her off-spring, 
consumes c1t  and saves st amounts respectively. In the third period of life, the individ-
ual is unable to work and lives from her savings and interest income, that is, c2t+1 = Rst. 
Subsequently, the utility function of the individual over the three periods is defined as the 
following log-linear function:
 
The parameter q reflects the subjective discount factor. This form of the utility function is 
a variation of those used by de la Croix and Doepke (2003). In contrast to the approach 
of Fanti and Gori (2008a, 2008b) and Strulik (2003, 2004), we explicitly consider human 
capital of the children as an argument in the utility function.7
Moreover, we make the natural assumption that parents have a stronger preference for 
the quantity than the quality of children: 𝜇 > 𝛽. This assumption guarantees that the law 
of demand holds for the quality and quantity of children. In addition, we assume that the 
parent treats all her children equally with respect to their education. A representative parent 
is constrained by the following budget:
The wage rate per human capital unit w̃ and the interest factor Rt are determined on the 
world capital market since we consider a reasonably small country. The capital stock used 
in this economy adjusts according to the factor prices on the world market. Assuming that 
the physical capital is totally depreciated within one period, we get the following equations:
 
(6)U
(
c1t , c
2
t+1,Nt , ht+1
)
= lnc1t + qlnc
2
t+1 + 휇lnNt + 훽ln
(
ht+1
)
.
(7)c
1
t ≤ wt
(
1 − (1 − 휏)utNt − bNt − Tt
)
− st
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In the second period of life, each individual has to allocate her available time between 
working time, time to educate the children (1 − 휏)utNt, and time to rear the children bNt. 
The variable τ represents the subsidy rate. Assuming that it makes no difference if parents 
educate their children or if they are educated in public or private schools, then an alternative 
interpretation would be that parents pay for the schooling the amount (1 − 휏)utwt.
Additionally, the individual has to pay a payroll tax where the tax rate is Tt. If we normalise 
the available time to one and define lt as labour time, then lt =
(
1 − (1 − 휏)utNt − bNt − Tt
)
 
and the net income becomes ltwt = lt w̃ht. A second interpretation is that the individual earns 
the gross labour income wt and spends wt(1 − 휏)utNt units of her income for the education, 
wtbNt units for child-rearing, where the parameter 0 < b < 1 represents the constant time 
share or constant income share which is needed to rear a child and pays wtTt units as taxes. 
Equation (8) states that the individual lives in the third period of life from her savings and 
interest. Combining (7) and (8) gives us a single budget constraint:
 
We assume that the government finances the education subsidy by issuing government 
bonds Bt with a term of one period and collects the income share of Tt as a payroll tax to 
finance its debt and interest payments. This means that the public debt per worker at the 
beginning of the current period Dt equals the subsidy per child of the previous period times 
the interest factor, R. This implies that a worker pays back the subsidy her parents received 
based on the market conditions. That is:
 
It should be noted that parents are unable to get an analogous loan contract on the capital 
market because of legal restrictions and moral hazard problems. To guarantee a balanced 
government budget, the tax revenue per worker in period t has to be:
 
The government is financing the education subsidies by a public debt which will be covered 
by the tax revenue in the future. Using (2), we maximise (6) subject to (9) by constructing 
the following Lagrange function:
 
Accordingly, the first order conditions are:
(8)c2t+1 ≤ Rt+1st
(9)wt
(
1 − (1 − 휏)utNt − bNt − Tt
)
− c1t −
c2t+1
Rt+1
= 0.
(10)Dt = RBt−1 = R휏ut−1wt−1.
(11)Tt =
RBt−1
wt
= R
휏ut−1ht−1
ht
=
R휏ut−1
1 + 휑ut−1
.
L
(
c1t , c
2
t+1, 휆
)
= lnc1t + qlnc
2
t+1 + 휇lnNt + 훽ln
(
ht−1(1 + 휑ut)
)
(12)−휆
(
wt
(
1 − (1 − 휏)utNt − bNt − Tt
)
− c1t −
c2t+1
Rt+1
)
.
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Substituting (15) into (16) and solving for the investment in education gives:
From equation (18) we can derive the necessary condition for the existence of an interior 
solution for u∗ ∈ [0, 1]:
 
Notably, the inequality (19) will not hold for all 휏 ∈ [0, 1] because the expression in the mid-
dle will strive to infinity if the subsidy rate converges to one. Therefore, we must restrict our 
analysis with respect to the subsidy rate. Especially, we assume throughout the paper that:
 
Given this condition, the existence of an interior equilibrium is guaranteed in this economy 
without any government intervention. Consequently, we analyse the effects of a subsidy 
rate 𝜏 ∈ [0, 𝜏] because all 𝜏 > 𝜏 lead into an undesirable corner solution in the equilibrium. 
Due to the fact that b has to lie between 0 and 1, we can derive from (20) that φβ > μ must 
hold in the case of no subsidy (휏 = 0). In combination with the assumption that 𝜇 > 𝛽, 
we conclude that 𝜑b > 𝜇
𝛽
> 1. Subsequently, the growth rate of human capital is given by:
 
Solving for the remaining independent variables, we get the following equilibrium quantities:
(13)
1
c1t
+ 휆 = 0,
(14)
q
c2t+1
+
휆
R
= 0,
(15)
휇
Nt
+ 휆wt
[
(1 − 휏)ut + b
]
= 0,
(16)
휑훽
1 + 휑ut
+ 휆wt(1 − 휏)Nt = 0,
(17)wt
(
1 − (1 − 휏)utNt − bNt − Tt
)
− c1t −
c2t+1
R
= 0.
(18)u∗ =
휑훽b − (1 − 휏)휇
(1 − 휏)(휇 − 훽)휑
.
(19)
𝜇
𝜑𝛽
≤
b
(1 − 𝜏)
<
(
𝜑 + 1
𝜑
)(
𝜇
𝛽
)
− 1.
(20)
𝜇
𝜑𝛽
≤ b <
(
𝜑 + 1
𝜑
)(
𝜇
𝛽
)
− 1.
(21)gh∗ =
휑훽b − (1 − 휏)휇
(1 − 휏)(휇 − 훽)
.
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Here we restrict our analysis to interior equilibria which are characterised by a non-nega-
tive equilibrium fertility rate (N∗t ≥ 0), a non-negative and feasible investment in human 
capital (0 ≤ u* ≤ 1) and non-negative consumption levels in both periods of life. We relate 
the equilibrium values to ht-1 instead of ht because we will need this later to calculate the 
long-run effects caused by a change of 휏. To ensure that the tax rate Tt is smaller than one, 
the maximum subsidy rate 𝜏 is given by the value of:
 
In addition, it can be shown that N∗t ≥ 0 as long as 𝜏 ∈ [0, 𝜏].
Proposition 1: The existence of a unique interior equilibrium without government inter-
vention is guaranteed if condition (20) is fulfilled.
Proof:
In the absence of a government intervention (18), and (21)-(24) becomes:
 
 
 
 
 
(22)c1∗t =
ht−1w̃
[
𝜑𝛽(b(𝜑 − 𝜏R) − (1 − 𝜏)) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜇𝜏R
]
𝜑(1 − 𝜏)
(
1 + q + 𝜇
)
(𝜇 − 𝛽)
,
(23)c2∗t+1 = Rq
(
ht−1w̃
[
𝜑𝛽(b(𝜑 − 𝜏R) − (1 − 𝜏)) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜇𝜏R
]
𝜑(1 − 𝜏)
(
1 + q + 𝜇
)
(𝜇 − 𝛽)
)
,
(24)N∗t =
(휇 − 훽)
[
휑훽(b(휑 − 휏R) − (1 − 휏)) + (1 − 휏)휇휏R
](
1 + q + 휇
)
훽(1 − 휑b − 휏)2
.
(25)𝜏 = 𝛽𝜑 + R(𝜇 − b𝛽𝜑) +
√
𝜑2𝛽2(bR − 1)2 − 2R𝜇𝜑𝛽(1 + bR − 2b𝜑) + 𝜇2R2
2𝜇R
.
(18)u∗ =
휑훽b − 휇
(휇 − 훽)휑
(21)gh∗ =
휑훽b − 휇
(휇 − 훽)
.
(22)c1∗t =
ht−1w̃𝛽(𝜑b − 1)(
1 + q + 𝜇
)
(𝜇 − 𝛽)
,
(23)c2∗t+1 = Rq
(
ht−1w̃𝛽(𝜑b − 1)(
1 + q + 𝜇
)
(𝜇 − 𝛽)
)
,
(24)N
∗
t =
(휇 − 훽)휑(
1 + q + 휇
)
(휑b − 1)
.
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As noted, condition (20) guarantees that 0 < u∗ < 1. Further, the condition ensures that 
𝜑b > 1. This, combined with the assumption 𝜇 > 𝛽 ensures that all other independent 
variables have positive values.
Proposition 2: A unique interior equilibrium described by equations (18) and (21)-(24) 
exists, if 𝜏 ∈ [0, 𝜏] and condition (20) is fulfilled.
Because of our relatively small country assumption, the capital intensity per human capital 
unit is determined on the international capital market. The private savings per capita is given by:
 
To calculate the amount of resources available to invest in physical capital, we subtract the 
amount of government bonds per head that are issued in the corresponding period. The 
government bonds per capita issued in the current period accumulate to:
 
The net wealth per capita in the beginning of period t+1, at+1, is the savings per capita of 
period t minus the government bonds per capita issued in period t and the result is divided 
by the number of children born in period t:
 
However, if the wealth per capita is smaller than the capital per capita, the country is a net 
borrower on the international capital market. Now we analyse the short- and long-run effects 
of an increasing subsidy rate 휏 on the equilibrium values of this economy.
3. Short-run effects
If the government introduces an education subsidy in period 0, then the parents are offered 
a subsidy for education but they do not have to pay a tax like all following parent gener-
ations and their human capital stock is given. As a consequence, the budget constraint is 
somewhat different from (9) because T
0
= 0. Repeating the maximisation procedure with 
the adjusted budget restriction yields the following results:
 
 
 
(26)s∗t = qht−1w̃
([
𝜑𝛽(b(𝜑 − 𝜏R) − (1 − 𝜏)) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜇𝜏R
]
𝜑(1 − 𝜏)
(
1 + q + 𝜇
)
(𝜇 − 𝛽)
)
.
(27)
Bt = 𝜏ht−1w̃u
∗
t N
∗
t = 𝜏ht−1w̃
[
𝜑𝛽(b(𝜑 − 𝜏R) − (1 − 𝜏)) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜇𝜏R
]
((1 − 𝜏)𝜇 − 𝜑𝛽b)
(1 − 𝜏)
(
1 + q + 𝜇
)
𝛽𝜑(𝛽𝜑 − 1 + 𝜏)
2
.
(28)
a∗t+1 = ht−1w̃
[
𝜏𝛽2𝜑b + 𝛽
(
𝜏2(q + 𝜇) + 𝜏(𝜑b − 1)(2q − 𝜇) + q(𝜑b − 1)2
)
+ (1 − 𝜏)𝜏𝜇2
]
(1 − 𝜏)𝜑(𝜇 − 𝛽)2
.
(29)u0 =
휑훽b − (1 − 휏)휇
(1 − 휏)(휇 − 훽)휑
.
(30)gh0 =
휑훽b − (1 − 휏)휇
(1 − 휏)(휇 − 훽)
.
(31)c
1
0
=
h
0
w̃(
1 + q + 𝜇
) ,
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Obviously, the consumption behaviour and therefore the savings behaviour, is not influenced 
by the introduction of the subsidy. However, the subsidy influences the level of education, 
the number of children and the per capita growth rate. Differentiating (29), (30) and (31) 
gives us:
 
 
 
As expected, the subsidy enhances the level of education and therefore the growth rate 
of human capital accumulation with a simultaneous decline in the number of children. 
The result that the aggregate consumption expenditures and the share of income spent for 
consumption remain unchanged is due to the additive separability of the utility function. 
This characteristic of the utility function leads to the result that only a substitution effect 
between the quantity and quality of children occurs. The subsidy decreases the relative price 
of the child quality and raises the relative price of the quantity of children. The outcome is 
a lower number of children who receive a higher level of education. These effects lead to a 
change of the parents’ welfare:
 
The less surprising result is an increase of parents’ utility.
Proposition 3: In the short run, the introduction of an education subsidy leads to an 
increase in the growth rate of human capital accumulation, the utility of the parents, and 
a decline of the fertility rate.
(32)c21 = Rq
h
0
w̃(
1 + q + 𝜇
) ,
(33)N0 =
(휇 − 훽)휑(
1 + q + 휇
)
(휑b − 1 + 휏)
.
(34)
𝜕u
0
𝜕𝜏
=
𝛽b
(1 − 𝜏)2(𝜇 − 𝛽)
> 0,
(35)
𝜕gh
0
𝜕𝜏
=
𝜑𝛽b
(1 − 𝜏)2(𝜇 − 𝛽)
> 0,
(36)
휕c1
0
휕휏
=
휕c2
1
휕휏
= 0.
(37)N0 =
(휇 − 훽)휑(
1 + q + 휇
)
(휑b − 1 + 휏)
.
(38)
𝜕U
(
c1
0
, c2
1
,N
0
, h
1
)
𝜕𝜏
=
𝜑𝛽b − (1 − 𝜏)𝜇
(1 − 𝜏)(𝜑b − 1 + 𝜏)
> 0.
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Before proceeding to the analysis of the long-run effects, note that the aggregated non-fi-
nancial wealth of the economy tends to decline because a part of the savings will be invested 
in the government bonds to finance the subsidies. However, the change of the non-financial 
wealth per capita does not necessarily decrease because the number of children is also lower 
than in the previous periods. The non-financial wealth in period 1 is defined by:
 
If an education subsidy will be introduced, the wealth per capita can be determined by 
differentiating (39) with respect to the subsidy rate and evaluating the derivative at 휏 = 0:
 
Proposition 4: The introduction of an education subsidy results in an increase of the non-fi-
nancial wealth per capita in the following period, only if the subjective time preference for 
the future is sufficiently large (q > bβφ - μ).
This also means that the net borrowing position of the country will improve provided 
the condition of proposition 4 holds.
4. Long-run effects
This part of the analysis is relevant for all generations born in period zero and thereafter. 
In contrast to the short-run analysis, we take into account that each individual has to pay a 
tax, which is used to cover the public debt and the corresponding interest. Differentiating 
(18) and (21) leads to the following results:
 
 
The long-run effects regarding the educational level and the growth rate of human capital 
are identical to the corresponding effects in the short run.
Because the subsidy rate has to be sufficiently small as noted in Proposition 2, we evaluate 
the following derivatives at 휏 = 0. As opposed to the educational time and growth rate, the 
number of children will decline more than in the short run. This is induced by the payroll 
tax which reduces the net income, and the assumption that the costs of rearing children 
grow proportionally to the gross income.
 
(39)a1 =
s
0
− 𝜏h
0
w̃u
0
N
0
N
0
=
h
0
w̃(q(𝜑b − 1) − 𝜏2(q + 𝜇) − 𝜏(b𝛽𝜑 − 𝜇 − q(2 − 𝜑b)))
(1 − 𝜏)(𝜇 − 𝛽)𝜑
.
(40)
𝜕a
1
𝜕𝜏
||||𝜏=0 = h0w̃(q + 𝜇 − b𝛽𝜑)𝜑(𝜇 − 𝛽) ⋚0.
(41)
𝜕u∗
𝜕𝜏
=
𝛽b
(1 − 𝜏)2(𝜇 − 𝛽)
> 0.
(42)
𝜕g∗h
𝜕𝜏
=
𝜑𝛽b
(1 − 𝜏)2(𝜇 − 𝛽)
> 0.
(43)
𝜕N∗
𝜕𝜏
||||𝜏=0 = −(𝜇 − 𝛽)(𝜑𝛽 + R(𝜑b𝛽 − 𝜇))(𝜑b − 1)2(1 + q + 𝜇)𝛽 < 0.
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As distinct from the short-run effects, the consumption and hence the individual savings 
in the first and second period of life will change as follows:
 
 
 
The sign of the derivatives (43) and (44) depends on, among other parameter values, the 
ratio between the education coefficient 휑, and the interest factor R.
Proposition 5: The introduction of an education subsidy financed by a public debt 
increases the consumption in both periods of life and the private savings only if, 𝜑
R
> 1 −
𝜇
𝜑b𝛽
.
Since the R.H.S. of the condition in Proposition 5 is assumed to be less than 1, the con-
sumption can increase even though the interest factor exceeds the education coefficient. 
This is caused by the reduction of the number of children.
Further, we examine how the education subsidy affects the non-financial wealth per 
capita. Differentiating (28) subject to the subsidy rate and evaluating it at 휏 = 0, gives:
Whether the non-financial wealth is increasing or decreasing depends strongly on the time 
preference for future consumption. Solving for the critical value of q leads to:
 
Proposition 6: The introduction of an education subsidy raises the non-financial wealth 
per capita only if the subjective time preference factor q exceeds the critical value q̄.
If the condition of Proposition 6 holds, the net borrowing position of the country will 
improve, and if the country was a debtor country, it will become a lending country after 
the introduction of the education subsidy, albeit in the long run.
Next, we analyse the long-run welfare effects. Accordingly, we consider whether all the 
generations in the (very) long run are better off because of the increased growth rate. 
Therefore, the relevant generation to consider is the one which receives a minimal gain from 
the growth rate increase but has to bear a higher tax burden caused by the increased subsidy.
Hence, by inserting the corresponding equilibrium values (18) and (21)–(24) in the 
utility function (6), differentiating it with respect to the subsidy rate, and evaluating the 
expression at τ = 0 yields:
(44)
𝜕c1∗t
𝜕𝜏
|||||𝜏=0 =
w̃
(
𝜑2b𝛽 − R(𝜑b𝛽 − 𝜇)
)(
1 + q + 𝜇
)
(𝜇 − 𝛽)𝜑
⋚0,
(44)
𝜕c1∗t
𝜕𝜏
|||||𝜏=0 =
w̃
(
𝜑2b𝛽 − R(𝜑b𝛽 − 𝜇)
)(
1 + q + 𝜇
)
(𝜇 − 𝛽)𝜑
⋚0,
(45)
𝜕c2∗t+1
𝜕𝜏
|||||𝜏=0 =
w̃Rq
(
𝜑2b𝛽 − R(𝜑b𝛽 − 𝜇)
)(
1 + q + 𝜇
)
(𝜇 − 𝛽)𝜑
⋚0.
(46)
𝜕a∗t+1
𝜕𝜏
|||||𝜏=0 =
w̃
(
𝛽
(
𝜑𝛽b + q
(
𝜑2b2 − 1
)
− 𝜇(1 + 𝜑b)
)
+ 𝜇2
)
𝜑(𝜇 − 𝛽)2
⋚0.
(47)q̄ =
(𝜇 − 𝛽)(𝜑b𝛽 − 𝜇)
𝛽(𝜑b − 1)2
.
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Setting the R.H.S. of the derivative to 0 and solving for R gives us:
 
Proposition 7: The introduction of an education subsidy financed by a public debt generates 
an A-Pareto-improvement8 only if the market interest factor is sufficiently low (R < R̄).
If the interest rate is too high, the tax burden outweighs the positive effect of increased 
growth and the additional utility generated by the extra human capital. Of course, as time 
elapses since the introduction of the education subsidy, the more important is the growth 
effect. However, when the interest factor is not sufficiently large, an A-Pareto improvement 
can be realised.
5 Conclusions
In this article, we show that building human capital financed through a public debt can pro-
vide a beneficial outcome both on the current and future generations. An important feature 
of the modelling and theoretical analysis presented is that, unlike previous studies, we reach 
results without directly including the positive externality generated through human capital 
accumulation.9 Thus, our results are interpreted to show that public education should be 
financed by a government debt to internalise the intertemporal positive externality caused 
through human capital building. Specifically, we have shown that the proposed finance 
mechanism reduces the fertility rate and enhances the human capital accumulation and 
hence the per capita growth rate of income.
It should be noted that in the results it is not necessary that the rate of return on human 
capital φ exceeds the rate of return of physical capital R. However, Barro and Lee (2010) 
note that in the period 1950–2010, the rate of return of each year of additional schooling 
exceeded in all parts of the world by 6%, and by 12% in developed countries. These results 
coincide with earlier ones of 6–10% rate of return (Acemoglu and Angrist 2000; Card 
1999). However, these results do not take into account the positive externality which is 
omitted in our analysis but exists. Further, we have shown that the net borrowing position 
of the economy improves and the welfare increases under certain conditions. Therefore, it 
is strongly recommended that the SGP of the EU should consider subtracting the public 
expenditures for education from the government deficit before the 3% deficit to GDP cri-
terion is calculated.10 Otherwise, any austerity measures will create more harm in the long 
run than they create benefits. For example, Ježić (2012) recommended that Croatia needs to 
increase its human capital investment. However, we note that the government reduced it in 
2014 by 1.95% as a consequence of the European austerity policy, although the educational 
expenditures was only 4.2% of the Croatian GDP (2011) which was far less than the EU 
and Organisation for Economic Cooperaton and Development (OECD) average of 5.28%.
(48)휕U
(
c1∗t , c
2∗
t+1, N
∗
t , ht+1
)
휕휏
|||||휏=0 =
(
1 + 휇 + q
)[
휑훽b(휑 − R) + 휇
(
R − 휑훽
1+휇+q
)]
휑훽(휑b − 1)
⋚0.
(48)R̄ =
𝜑𝛽
(
𝜑b
(
1 + 𝜇 + q
)
− 𝜇
)(
1 + 𝜇 + q
)
(𝜑b𝛽 − 𝜇)
.
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Additionally, from a development aid perspective, it would make sense to give conces-
sional loans to small and developing countries to finance education and human capital 
development in areas of resource deficit.
Notes
1.  See Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Public_
expenditure_on_education,_2011_%28%C2%B9%29_%28%25_of_GDP%29_YB15.png 
(accessed 23 November 2015).
2.  See Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/graph.do?tab=graph&plugin=1&language= 
en&pcode=tps00068&toolbox=type (accessed 23 November 2015).
3.  For example, the following member states (regions) cut their educational expenditure in real 
terms according to Eurostat in 2014: Czech Republic (–3.33%), Ireland (–1.53%), Greece 
(–2.11), Croatia (–1.95%), Finland (–2.39%), Austria (–2.72%), UK (Wales) (–1.88%), 
Belgium (French region –0.07%; German region –18.22%).
4.  Expressed in per human capital unit the production function becomes to f (k̃t = F
(
K̃t
Ht
, 1
)
. 
We assume that the corresponding Inada conditions hold: f (0) = 0; f (∞) = ∞; f
�
(∞) = 0;
and f �(0) = ∞.
5.  Then ut must be interpreted as the share of income which is spent for education.
6.  Li, Zhang, and Zhu (2008), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) and Rosenzweig and Zhang 
(2009) confirm the existence of the quality-quantity trade-off of children econometrically.
7.  Unfortunately, in all four papers the suspected interior maxima are no maxima, because they 
suffer to fulfil the second order conditions. The corresponding proofs for this statement can 
be requested from the authors.
8.  The A-Pareto criterion was introduced by Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007) and refers to the 
assumption that only the utility of the actually born individuals are to be taken into account.
9.  See the references cited below.
10.  Or more precisely, the criterion should be reformulated as: (total government expenditures-
public educational expenditures-total tax revenues)/GDP<3%. Accordingly, the debt to GDP 
ratio has also to be adjusted.
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